Recent Decisions - State and Federal: Coverage of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement by Gentile, Andrea
University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 8
Number 2 February, 1978 Article 13
2-1978
Recent Decisions - State and Federal: Coverage of
Uninsured Motorist Endorsement
Andrea Gentile
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gentile, Andrea (1978) "Recent Decisions - State and Federal: Coverage of Uninsured Motorist Endorsement," University of Baltimore






by Andrea Gentile 
The Court of Appeals recently con-
sidered the scope of an insurance com-
pany's liability under its own uninsured 
motorist's endorsement. By resolving an 
ambiguous insurance contract in favor of 
the insured, the court extended coverage 
beyond the probable intent of the insurer 
McKoy v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., Inc., 
281 Md. 26,374 A.2d 1170 (1977). 
Mrs. McKoy, a Maryland resident in-
sured by the defendant company, was 
driving in the District of Columbia when 
she was struck by a negligent D.C. 
motorist. Thereafter, McKoy began her at-
tempts to recoup damages for personal 
bodily injuries which she alleged to be 
$29,000. 
The problems confronted in this case 
resulted from the fact that financial 
responsibility laws regarding auto in-
surance vary from state to state. The 
minimum requirement for coverage in the 
District of Columbia for bodily injury 
liability insurance is $10,000 per person 
with an aggregate of $20,000 for all per-
sons injured as a result of the same occur-
rence. On the other hand, Maryland de-
mands a minimum of $20,000 coverage 
per person and an aggregate of $40,000 
to insure the injuries of all of the persons 
involved. Further, Maryland requires 
Uninsured Motorist Protection Coverage 
with the same $20,000/$40,000 limits. 
Maryland views any motorist, such as the 
Washington driver in this case, as unin-
sured if he has coverage of less than the 
required Maryland limits of 
$20,000/$40,000, even though the Dis-
trict's limits are satisfied. Thus, Mrs. 
McKoy was entitled to collect under the 
Uninsured Motorist provisions of her 
policy for an amount in excess of the 
tortfeasor's $10,000 coverage. 
The GEICO Insurance Company paid 
the $10,000 for which it had assumed 
liability as the insurer. Since her injuries 
exceeded this amount, Mrs. McKoy then 
submitted a claim to Aetna to recover the 
remainder of the damages under her Unin-
sured Motorist (UlM) coverage. At this 
point a difference of opinion arose as to 
the amount of Aetna's liability. Aetna 
contended that it was obliged to pay 
McKoy no more than $10,000; that under 
the terms stated in the Aetna U/M en-
dorsement, the company was allowed to 
"set-off" the $10,000, already paid to 
Mrs. McKoy by GEICO, against the 
$20,000 face amount of the endorsement. 
Aetna based its contention on the 
language contained in Part III of its UlM 
endorsement which reads as follows: 
III LIMITS OF LIABILITY 
(d) Any amount payable to an insured 
under the terms of this insurance shall be 
reduced by (1) all sums paid to such in-
sured for bodily injury or property 
damage by or on behalf of the person or 
organization legally liable therefore. 
Mrs. McKoy found this objectionable 
and brought an action in the Prince 
Georges County Circuit Court for a 
declaratory judgment to determine the 
amount of the Uninsured Motorist 
coverage provided by her Aetna policy. 
Plaintiff McKoy argued that the sole 
purpose of the "set-off" clause was to pre-
vent a double recovery of damages; that 
the amounts recoverable from other 
sources were to be subtracted from the 
total damages incurred but that they were 
not to affect the face amount of the 
policy. Simply stated, she felt that where 
she sustained damages for bodily injury 
amounting to $29,000, of which $10,000 
was paid by the "responsible person or 
organization," and she carried a $20,000 
limit on her own policy, she should be en-
titled to recover the remaining $19,000 
worth of damages from her insurer. 
The Circuit Court rejected Mrs. 
McKoy's argument and in agreeing with 
AETNA, stated that McKoy could claim 
only $10,000 from the insurer because 
despite total tiamages of $29,000 the 
total amount of Aetna liability ($20,000) 
was to be reduced, under the set-off 
clause of the Uninsured Motorist provi-
sion, by the $10,000 collected from the 
wrongdoer's insurer. 
McKoy then carried the dispute to the 
Court of Appeals, which reversed. 
In determining the extent of Aetna's 
liability under their own contract, the 
Court looked to the language set forth in 
the U/M endorsement attached to the 
plaintiff's policy. 
Pertinent to the disposition of the case 
are three parts. 
First, Part I outlines the primary 
liability of Aetna to Mrs. McKoy. The 
relevant language reads: "The Company 
will pay all sums which the insured or 
[his] legal representative shall be legally 
entitled to recover. ." (emphasis ad-
ded). 
Second, Part I1I(a) sets forth the dollar 
limit of Aetna's liability for inj uries (to 
anyone person covered by the policy) 
suffered in an accident "arising out of the 
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ownership, maintenance or use of an unin-
sured auto." Under this provision of 
McKoy's policy, Aetna limits its dollar 
liability to a single injured person 
(McKoy) at $20,000. 
Third, Part lII(d) , the set-off clause 
upon which Aetna relied, also modifies 
the primary liability of Part I by indicating 
that "any amount payable to the insured 
under the terms of [the policy] shall be 
reduced" by the amount of sums paid to 
the insured "on behalf of the tortfeasor." 
See Id., at 30, 374 A.2d at 1172. 
There was no dispute that Part III (d) 
meant that the $10,000 from the D.C. 
driver's insurance already paid to Mrs. 
McKoy should act as a set-off. The issue 
became one of determining the proper 
referent of the phrase "any amount paya-
ble." If this meant the total amount corre-
sponding to the total damages, $29,000, 
suffered by Mrs. McKoy, then the 
$10,000 set-off would leave Aetna with a 
$19,000 obligation. On the other hand, if 
those words in III (d) referred to the 
amount payable from Aetna to McKoy, 
$20,000, then the application of the set-
off would leave Aetna with a mere 
$10,000 obligation. 
In holding for Mrs. McKoy, the court 
stated that both lII(a) and III (d) were inde-
pendent modifiers of the total amounts 
payable clause in Part I. Thus, the set-off 
did not reduce the Aetna limit of liabilit~, 
but the total sums to which that liability 
was to be applied, i.e., the outstanding 
amount payable to plaintiff McKoy after 
the application of the $10,000 paid on 
behalf of the tortfeasor. 
In order to remove any doubt about the 
correctness of the result, the court stated: 
Even assuming that the interpretation 
of the policy urged upon us by Aetna is 
an equally reasonable one, this would, 
at best, create an ambiguity. In such 
Situations, ambiguities are resolved 
against the author of the instru-
ment. Penn., Etc., Ins. Co. v. 
Shirer, 224 Md. 530, 537, 168 A.2d 
525,528 (1961). 
281 Md. at 31,374 A.2d at 1173. 
The decision of the court rested en-
tirely upon the construction of the Unin-
sured Motorists Endorsement issued by 
Aetna. To avoid this result in future cases 
involving the Uninsured Motorists 
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coverage, Aetna could restructure the 
language of its endorsement specifically 
to limit the coverage. While it is evident 
that the court intended that an insured 
benefit from as much of her insurance as 
possible, it could have reached a more en-
during result based upon substantive law 
rather than contract construction had it 
dealt with the alternative argument that 
the set-off clause was void under MD. ANN. 
CODE art. 48A §541. This section requires 
that insurers issuing policies for Maryland 
drivers provide a minimum of $20,000 
U!M coverage for each policy, and a court 
could construe the Code to require ap-
plication of the $20,000 obligation to the 
balance of "any amount payable" to an 
insured after application of a set-off. The 
court chose not to reach this question, 
and thus left this case vulnerable to isola-
tion on its facts. See id., at 28 n.l, 374 
A.2d 1171 n.l. 
McKoy articulates well the problem of 
uninsured motorists insurance protec-
tion--a problem acute in Maryland, which 
entertains more than its share of foreign 
drivers who are without sufficient 
coverage of their own. It also appears that 
the result in this case works a two-edged 
economic sword, with one blade cutting 
costs to an insurance consumer like 
McKoy by holding an insurance company 
to its full obligation in the manner pro-
vided by this court. The other edge, 
however, narrows company profit margin 
resulting in higher insurance rates. 
Terry 
Examined 
by James F. Kuhn 
The Court of Special Appeals has ren-
dered invalid an investigatory stop based 
solely on information received in a police 
radio broadcast absent other indications 
of present danger and criminal activity. 
Price v. State, 37 Md. App., 248, 376 
A.2d 1158 (1977). 
On April 5, 1975, a Prince George's 
County police officer on routine patrol 
received a radio broadcast that an armed 
robbery suspect, James Price, was 
believed to be driving a silver 1966 
Cadillac and that he was in possession of a 
shotgun, stolen goods, and narcotics. The 
officer, having sighted an automobile 
matching the description given in the 
broadcast down to the tag number, ap-
proached the driver when he stepped from 
the car in a gas station and conducted a 
patdown of the driver who at that time 
identified himself as James Price. This 
limited search, conducted on the basis of 
the radio alert alone, produced a knife 
from the person of the appellant. He was 
arrested on a weapons charge and subse-
quently convicted on separate charges, 
relating to a robbery which had occured 
three weeks earlier on the basis of evi-
dence seized by a second officer while 
searching the car in the gas station. 
Price's contention on appeal was that the 
state had failed to establish the necessary 
"reasonable suspicion" to justify his being 
stopped and frisked for weapons, thus vio-
lating rights guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. 
Nine years ago, the Supreme Court 
made clear in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 
(1968), that police officers may "in ap-
propriate circumstances and in an ap-
propriate manner approach a person for 
purposes of investigating possibly crimi-
nal behaviour even though there is no 
probable cause for making an arrest" and 
that where the officer "observes unusual 
conduct which leads him reasonably to 
conclude in light of his experience that 
criminal activity may be afoot and that 
the persons with whom he is dealing may 
be armed and presently dangerous" he 
may conduct a limited frisk for weapons 
by patting down the outer clothing of the 
suspect. 392 U.S. at 22. Terry requires 
only that the officer be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts that would 
justify a reasonable suspicion that the in-
dividual is armed and presents a threat to 
the officer or bystanders. 
In Price, the state argued that the pat-
down was justified under the Terry 
doctrine in that a police broadcast that a 
suspect is armed and dangerous in and of 
itself justifies a patdown for weapons even 
if it does not constitute probable cause for 
arrest. The danger of too broad a reading 
